2016 – “La noción estructuralista de ‘comparabilidad empírica’ y la enseñanza modelo-teórica de las ciencias”

  • “La noción estructuralista de ‘comparabilidad empírica’ y la enseñanza modelo-teórica de las ciencias” (escrito con Yefrin Ariza y Agustín Adúriz-Bravo), Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Educativos 12(1) (2016): 11- ISSN: 1900-9895.

Abstract

Desde la metateoría estructuralista es posible suministrar elementos metateóricos que guíen y fundamenten las actuales líneas de trabajo de la didáctica de las ciencias, aquellas sobre su estatus disciplinar, sobre los análisis de sus objetos de estudio y sobre la introducción de contenidos de filosofía de la ciencia a la enseñanza y la formación de profesores de ciencias. Este trabajo intenta explorar algunos de los aportes posibles que la metateoría estructuralista puede ofrecer a la enseñanza de las ciencias, estableciendo algunas relaciones entre las actuales propuestas de la enseñanza basada en modelos y las consideraciones acerca de las nociones kuhnianas de inconmensurabilidad y comparabilidad ofrecidas por la metateoría estructuralista.

Keywords

modelos, didáctica modeloteórica de las ciencias, ciencia escolar, comparabilidad empírica

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Beca Posdoctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowship

Beca Posdoctoral en el Centro de Estudios de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia (CEFHIC), Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ), Argentina
Cierre del concurso: 10 de marzo de 2017
Comienzo: 1 de abril de 2017

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Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Center of Studies of Philosophy and History of Science (CEFHIC), National University of Quilmes (UNQ), Argentine
Closing date: March 10th, 2017
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2005 – “Ejemplares, modelos y principios en la genética clásica”

  • “Ejemplares, modelos y principios en la genética clásica” (“Exemplars, Models and Principles in Classical Genetics”) (in Spanish), Scientiae Studia. Revista Latino-Americana de Filosofía e História da Ciência, 3(2) (2005): 185-203. ISSN: 1678-3166.

Resumen

Tomando como punto de partida el libro de Sinnott y Dunn, Principles of Genetics: An Elementary Text, with Problems, que podría ser considerado el primer libro de texto de genética clásica en sentido kuhniano, y el análisis de la estructura de las teorías biológicas y/o biomédicas realizado por Darden y Schaffner, discutiré el problema de la existencia de leyes fundamentales o principios-guía en la biología, a la luz del examen de la genética clásica llevado a cabo en el marco de la concepción estructuralista de las teorías científicas.
Palabras clave: libro de texto, teoría biológica, genética clásica, ejemplar, modelo, principio, ley fundamental, ley especial.

Abstract

Taking as starting point Kuhn’s analysis of science textbooks and its application to Sinnott and Dunn’s Principles of Genetics: An Elementary Text, with Problems (1925), it will be discussed the problem of the existence of laws in biology. In particular, it will be showed, in accordance with the proposals of Darden (1991) and Schaffner (1980, 1986, 1993), the relevance of the exemplars, diagrammatically or graphically represented, in the way in which is carried out the teaching and learning process of classical genetics, inasmuch as the information contained in them, indispensable for the right development of that process, exceeds the information contained in the “laws” linguistically articulated and presented in the textbooks. However, it will be maintained that the information is implicit in the law that according to the structuralist concept of fundamental law and the reconstruction of genetics presented by Balzer & Dawe (1990), and later developed by Balzer & Lorenzano (1997) and Lorenzano (1995, 2000, 2002a) could be considered the fundamental law of classical genetics,the law of matching, clearly identified in this paper.
Keywords: textbook, biological theory, classical genetics, exemplar, model, principle, fundamental law, special law.

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Publicado en 2005, Artículos, Articles, List of Publications, Lista de publicaciones, On-line Publications, Publicaciones on line, Publicaciones on line por año. Etiquetas: , , , , , , , , , , , , .

2014-2015 – “Principios-guía y leyes fundamentales en la metateoría estructuralista”

  • “Principios-guía y leyes fundamentales en la metateoría estructuralista”, Cuadernos del Sur 43-44 (2014-2015): 35-74. ISSN: 1668-7434 (Print), 2362-2989 (Online).

Abstract

El objetivo del presente trabajo es proponer una caracterización de principio-guía y ley fundamental en el marco de la metateoría estructuralista. Se señalan cinco “condiciones necesarias”, “condiciones necesarias débiles” o «síntomas» que debe satisfacer o mostrar un enunciado para que sea considerado como una ley fundamental de una teoría: 1) poseer carácter arracimado o sinóptico, 2) valer en todas las aplicaciones intencionales, 3) ser cuasi-vacuo (“empíricamente irrestricto” o, si se prefiere, “sintético a priori” o incluso “analítico a posteriori”), 4) cumplir con un papel sistematizador y 5) poseer fuerza modal, y se caracteriza a los principios-guía como leyes fundamentales de un tipo peculiar, a saber: como leyes fundamentales que poseen las siguientes características adicionales: contar con al menos un “funcional” dentro de sus términos T-teóricos y cuantificar existencialmente sobre él. Luego se relaciona del análisis presentado con el problema de las leyes de la naturaleza. Y se concluye con la discusión de algunos posibles contraejemplos.

Keywords

Principios-guía; Leyes fundamentales; Metateoría estructuralista.

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2016 – “Meta-Theoretical Contributions to the Constitution of a Model-Based Didactics of Science”

  • “Meta-Theoretical Contributions to the Constitution of a Model-Based Didactics of Science” (escrito con Yefrin Ariza y Agustín Adúriz-Bravo), Science & Education (2016). DOI: 10.1007/s11191-016-9845-3. ISSN: 0926-7220 (Print), 1573-1901 (Online).

Abstract

There is nowadays consensus in the community of didactics of science (i.e. science education understood as an academic discipline) regarding the need to include the philosophy of science in didactical research, science teacher education, curriculum design, and the practice of science education in all educational levels. Some authors have identified an ever-increasing use of the concept of ‘theoretical model’, stemming from the so-called semantic view of scientific theories. However, it can be recognised that, in didactics of science, there are over-simplified transpositions of the idea of model (and of other metatheoretical ideas). In this sense, contemporary philosophy of science is often blurred or distorted in the science education literature. In this paper, we address the discussion around some meta-theoretical concepts that are introduced into didactics of science due to their perceived educational value. We argue for the existence of a ‘semantic family’, and we characterise four different versions of semantic views existing within the family. In particular, we seek to contribute to establishing a model-based didactics of science mainly supported in this semantic family.

Keywords

Didactics of Science; Theoretical Model; Contemporary Philosophy of Science; Semantic View

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2015 – “Are Natural Selection Explanatory Models A Priori?”

  • “Are Natural Selection Explanatory Models A Priori?” (escrito con José A. Díez), Biology & Philosophy 30(6) (2015): 787-809. DOI: 10.1007/s10539-015-9498-7. ISSN: 0169-3867 (Print), 1572-8404 (Online).

Abstract

The epistemic status of Natural Selection (NS) has seemed intriguing to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that NS, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics (CM) and most other standard theories are not. Sober’s argument focuses on some ‘‘would promote’’ sentences that according to him, play a central role in NS explanations and are both causal and a priori. Lange and Rosenberg criticize Sober arguing that, though there may be some unspecific a priori causal claims, there are not a priori causal claims that specify particular causal factors. Although we basically agree with Lange and Rosenberg’s criticism, we think it remains silent about a second important element in Sober’s dialectics, namely his claim that, contrary to what happens in mechanics, in NS explanatory conditionals are a priori, and that this is so in quite specific explanatory models. In this paper we criticize this second element of Sober’s argument by analyzing what we take to be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, and argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in NS can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to CM and other standard, highly unified theories. We conclude that this second claim is unsound, or at least that more needs to be said in order to sustain that NS explanatory models are a priori in a sense in which CM models are not.

Keywords: Natural selection – Sober – A priori explanatory models

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2013 – Bibliography of Structuralism III (1995-2012, and Additions)

  • “Bibliography of Structuralism III (1995-2012, and Additions)” (escrito con Cláudio Abreu y C. Ulises Moulines), Metatheoria. Revista de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia/Journal of Philosophy and History of Science/Revista de Filosofia e História da Ciência 3(2) (2013): 1-36. ISSN: 1853-2322. eISSN: 1853-2330.

Abstract

In two occasions a Bibliography of Structuralism has been published in Erkenntnis (1989, 1994). Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridge and the structuralist program has shown a continuous development. The aim of the present bibliography is to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the publication of An Architectonic for Science–structuralism’s main reference work–and of its recent translation into Spanish by updating the previous bibliographies with titles which have appeared since 1994 as well as before that year but which are not included in them. As in the former deliveries, this bibliography only covers books and articles that are concerned directly with the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. We would like to thank the many colleagues who have helped us in collecting all the information. Notwithstanding we apologize in advance for the possible entries that we missed to include in this third Bibliography of Structuralism.

Keywords: bibliography – structuralism – philosophy of science

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