2007 – “The Influence of Genetics on Philosophy of Science: Classical Genetics and the Structuralist View of Theories”

• “The Influence of Genetics on Philosophy of Science: Classical Genetics and the Structuralist View of Theories”, en Fagot-Largeault, A., Torres, J.M. y S. Rahman (eds.), The Influence of Genetics on Contemporary Thinking, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, pp. 99-115.

Abstract
Taking as starting point the first textbook of classical genetics that clearly exemplifies all the features that Kuhn takes to be constitutive of a science textbook, Sinnott and Dunn’s (1925), as well as Darden’s (1991) and Schaffner’s (1980, 1986, 1993) analyses of the structure of biomedical and/or biological theories, I will discuss the problem of the existence of laws in biology. The framework of this discussion is provided by the structuralist conception of theories. The result of this analysis will be the identification of the fundamental law of classical genetics: the law of matching, which satisfies all weak necessary conditions for law-likeness that are postulated by the structuralist approach of theories, and the recognition of the so-called ‘Mendel’s Laws’ as special laws of classical genetics. This shows that the structuralist view is capable of providing an interesting perspective on genetics, which, in turn, has a positive effect on philosophy of science, because it shows we have a framework at hand in which important philosophical problems can fruitfully be addressed.

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2006 – “Fundamental Laws and Laws of Biology”

• “Fundamental Laws and Laws of Biology”, en Ernst, G. y K.-G. Niebergall (eds.), Philosophie der Wissenschaft – Wissenschaft der Philosophie. Festschrift für C.Ulises Moulines zum 60. Geburstag, Paderborn (Alemania): Mentis-Verlag, 2006, pp. 129-155.

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss the problem of scientific laws in general and laws of biology in particular. After reviewing the debate around the existence of laws in biology, I examine the subject in the light of the structuralist notion of a fundamental law and argue for the law of matching as the fundamental law of genetics.

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2000 – “Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics”

• “Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics”, en Balzer, W., Moulines, C.U. y J. Sneed (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000, pp. 251-284.

Abstract

This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These results are of methodological, philosophical and didactical relevance.

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2005 – “Comentarios a ‘Explicación teórica y compromisos ontológicos: un modelo estructuralista’ de C.U. Moulines”

• “Comentarios a ‘Explicación teórica y compromisos ontológicos: un modelo estructuralista’ de C.U. Moulines”, Enrahonar: quaderns de filosofia 37 (2005): 55-59.

Resumen

En este comentario al trabajo de Ulises Moulines no me referiré al interesante análisis de los compromisos ontológicos que profundiza los tratamientos de los llamados «modelos de datos», ni tampoco discutiré los principios metafísicos generales presupuestos en su planteo, adoptando una posición experimentalista, instrumentalista, anti-realista, positivista o empirista. Me centraré en la última parte de su artículo en la que desarrolla los vínculos entre el enfoque causalista de Wesley Salmon y el análisis estructuralista de la explicación entendida como subsunción teórica, al relacionarlo con el análisis estructuralista de los términos teóricos, a la luz de cierta comprensión general compartida de la labor epistemológica.
Palabras clave: explicación, estructuralismo, compromiso ontológico, subsunción teórica, modelos.

Abstract

In this comment on the work by Ulises Moulines I shall not refer to the interesting analysis of the ontological commitments that depends the treatment of the so-called «data models», nor shall I debate the general metaphysical principles proposed in his approach, adopting an experimentalist, instrumentalist, anti-realistic, positivist or empirical stance. I shall focus on the last part of his article in which he elaborates on the links between Wesley Salmon’s causalist approach and the structuralist analysis of explanation viewed as theoretical subsumption, as he relates it to the structural analysis of the theoretical terms in light of a certain general shared understanding of the job of epistemology.
Key words: explanation, structuralism, ontological commitment, theoretical subsumption, models.

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2000 – “The Logical Structure of Classical Genetics”

• “The Logical Structure of Classical Genetics” (escrito con Wolfgang Balzer), Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31, n° 2 (2000): 243-266.

SUMMARY. We present a reconstruction of so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics using a notation which we believe is more legible than that of earlier accounts, and lends itself easily to computer implementation, for instance in PROLOG. By drawing from, and emending, earlier work of Balzer and Dawe (1986, 1997), the present account presents the three most important lines of development of classical genetics: the so-called Mendel’s laws, linkage genetics and gene mapping, in the form of a theory-net. This shows that the set theoretic representation format used in the structuralist approach to the philosophy of science also applies to the domain of genetic theories. The reconstruction is intended to lend more clarity to the methodological, philosophical and didactical discussions of the foundations of genetics, and on the other hand to defend a formally, logically minded view of theories which seems to have become contested through the work of Feyerabend, Kuhn and Kitcher.
Key words: axiomatization, classical genetics, fundamental laws, genetics, structuralism

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1996 – “En memoria de Thomas S. Kuhn”

• “En memoria de Thomas S. Kuhn” (escrito con César Lorenzano), Redes. Revista de Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia 7 (1996): 217-236.

El objetivo de este trabajo es el de rendir homenaje a Thomas S. Kuhn luego de su muerte, a través de la presentación de sus conceptos fundamentales de paradigma, comunidad científica, ciencia normal y revoluciones científicas y que, junto a los de anomalía, crisis e inconmensurabilidad, son los que utiliza Kuhn para interpretar la ciencia y su desarrollo, culminando con una nota biográfica y su bibliografía completa.

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2011 – “What Would Have Happened if Darwin Had Known Mendel (or Mendel’s Work)?”

• “What Would Have Happened if Darwin Had Known Mendel (or Mendel’s Work)?”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33 (2011): 3-48.

Abstract

The question posed by the title is usually answered by saying that the “synthesis” between the theory of evolution by natural selection and classical genetics, which took place in 1930s-40s, would have taken place much earlier if Darwin had been aware of Mendel and his work. What is more, it nearly happened: it would have been enough if Darwin had cut the pages of the offprint of Mendel’s work that was in his library and read them! Or, if Mendel had come across Darwin in London or paid him a visit at his house in the outskirts! (on occasion of Mendel’s trip in 1862 to that city). The aim of the present paper is to provide elements for quite a different answer, based on further historical evidence, especially on Mendel’s works, some of which mention Darwins’s studies.

Keywords – Darwin, Mendel, hybridism, speciation, evolution

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2011 – “La filosofía de la ciencia y el lenguaje: relaciones cambiantes, alcances y límites”

• “La filosofía de la ciencia y el lenguaje: relaciones cambiantes, alcances y límites”, Árbor 187, n° 747 (2011): 69-80.

Resumen

Este trabajo consta de tres secciones. En la primera, se señalarán algunos de los principales desarrollos de la filosofía de la ciencia durante el siglo xx y lo que va del xxi, ubicándolos en el marco de ciertas transformaciones filosóficas más generales, conocidas con los nombres de “giro lingüístico” y “giro pragmático”, respectivamente. En la segunda, se matizará la conexión establecida, fundamentalmente a partir de la revisión de la obra de un autor “clásico” como Carnap. Por último, se intentará realizar una suerte de “balance y perspectivas futuras”.

Palabras clave: lenguaje, ciencia, giro lingüístico, giro pragmático, Carnap, concepción estructuralista de las teorías

Philosophy of Science and Language: Changing Relationships, Scopes and Limits

Summary

This paper consists of three sections. In the first one, some of the main developments in the philosophy of science through the xx century up to the present will be pointed out, and inserted them in the frame of some more general philosophical transformations, such as the so-called “linguistic turn” and “pragmatic turn”, respectively. In the second one, the established connection will be nuanced, from a revision of the work of a “classical” author such as Carnap. Finally, it will be intended a kind of “balance and future perspectives”.

Keywords: language, science, linguistic turn, pragmatic turn, Carnap, structuralist view of theories

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2011 – “Presentación” a Lenguaje y Ciencia

• “Presentación” (escrito con Eulalia Pérez Sedeño), Árbor 187, n° 747 (2011): 1-4.

Se trata de la presentación realizada al volumen temático Lenguaje y Ciencia, de Árbor, revista de Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura, y que cuenta con la participación de distintos especialistas iberoamericanos.

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2011 – Lenguaje y Ciencia

• Pérez Sedeño, E. y P. Lorenzano (eds.), Lenguaje y Ciencia, volumen temático de Árbor, revista de Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura, Vol. 187, No. 747 (2011): 1-124, Madrid (España): Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2011.

Se trata del volumen temático Lenguaje y Ciencia, coeditado por Pérez Sedeño, E. y P. Lorenzano, de Árbor, revista de Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura, y que cuenta con la participación de distintos especialistas iberoamericanos. Su índice es el siguiente:

Lenguaje y Ciencia.

Pérez Sedeño y P. Lorenzano (eds.)

Sumario

Presentación

Eulalia Pérez Sedeño, Pablo Lorenzano: Presentación

Artículos

Jorge Martínez Contreras: Estudios pioneros en torno al origen del lenguaje natural

César Lorenzano: El lenguaje de la ciencia

Leticia O. Minhot: Teoría de conjuntos y ontología

Adriana Gonzalo: Perspectivas ontosemánticas en la concepción estructuralista de la ciencia

Olimpia Lombardi, Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz: Lenguaje, ontología y relaciones interteóricas: en favor de un genuino pluralismo ontológico

Luis Fernández Moreno: Términos de género natural e identidades teóricas

Décio Krause: ¿Es Priscilla, el positrón atrapado, un individuo? La física cuántica, el uso de nombres y la individuación

Pablo Lorenzano: La filosofía de la ciencia y el lenguaje: relaciones cambiantes, alcances y límites

Ricardo J. Gómez: Otto Neurath: lenguaje, ciencia y valores. La incidencia de lo político

Guiomar Elena Ciapuscio: De metáforas durmientes, endurecidas y nómades: un enfoque lingüistico de las metáforas en la comunicación de la ciencia

Eulalia Pérez Sedeño: El sexo de las metáforas

Andrés Rivadulla: Precisiones sobre la estrategia tropológica en ciencia

Anna Carolina Regner: Argumentación retórica y controversias: un estudio de caso

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